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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v

)

«

Case #20040285-CA

;

CLIFTON YAZZIE,
Defendant.

]
]
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION

This

is

Commitment

to

an
Utah

appeal

from

the

State

Prison,

Judgment

and

Order

of

dated March 30, 2004 (the

^Judgment"), of the Seventh Judicial District Court involving
criminal

convictions

for

Driving

Under

the

Influence

of

Alcohol with priors, a Third Degree Felony; No Insurance on
Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Driving on Suspended
or Revoked Operator's License, a Class C Misdemeanor.

This

Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. §78-2a-3 (2)(e).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue I: Did the trial
motion

to

reasonable

court

suppress

by finding

suspicion

to stop

err in denying
that

Chief

Appellant?

Appellant's

Halliday

had a

Standard of Review: The factual findings underlying the
trial court's decision with respect to a motion to suppress
the evidence are reviewed under the deferential
erroneous" standard.
(Utah 1994) accord
1993).
set

"clearly

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n. 4

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1272 (Utah

Furthermore, the "determination of whether a specific

of

facts

gives

rise

to

reasonable

suspicion

is a

determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for
correctness."

Pena,

at

939;

Thurman,

at

1272.

"The

reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a
measure of discretion to the trial judge when applying that
standard

to

a

given

set

of

facts.

Precisely

how much

discretion we cannot say...." Pena, at 939.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMEND. IV
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. 1 § 14

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On

October

17,

2003,

Clifton

"Xazzie") was charged by Information

Yazzie

(hereinafter

with Driving Under the

Influence of Alcohol with priors, a Third Degree Felony; No
Insurance on Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Driving

2

on

Suspended

or

Revoked

Operator's

License,

a

Class

C

Misdemeanor. R001-R003. On December 15, 2003, the matter came
for a preliminary hearing before Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of
the Seventh

Judicial

District

County, State of Utah. R057.
over on all three charges.

Court

in and

for San Juan

The trial court bound Yazzie

Id.

at p. 16.

On February 12, 2004, Yazzie filed his Motion
and Request

for

Hearing

to

Suppress

(the "Motion") requesting that the

trial court suppress the evidence taken or statements made
subsequent to the illegal stop and illegal search of Yazzie's
car (R018-R019).

On February 17, 2004, the matter came for

hearing on the Motion, at which time the trial court denied
the Motion

(R058) .

Based upon the denial of the Motion,

Yazzie entered a conditional guilty plea to all three charges,
specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of the
Motion

under

Ct.App.1988).

State
Id.

v.

Sery,

758

P.2d

935,

939

(Utah

at pp. 31-34.

On March 29, 2004, Yazzie came for sentencing before the
trial court (R059).

On that date, the trial court ordered

Yazzie to be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for a term
not to exceed five years, and in the San Juan County Jail for
six (6) months and 90 days to be served concurrently with the
3

prison sentence. R059 at p. 7.

On March 30, 2004, the trial

court entered the Judgment. R04 6-R050.
On April 7, 2004, Yazzie filed his Notice
the Judgment.
Statement
and

of Appeal

On April 27, 2004, Yazzie filed his

from

Docketing

challenging the trial court's denial of the Motion

questioning

whether

there

was

sufficient

basis

for

Halliday to stop Yazzie and his vehicle.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Facts Available to Halliday Prior to the Seizure.

Chief Halliday (hereinafter "Halliday") of the Blanding
City

Police

Department

has

known

enforcement for more than twenty

Yazzie

through

law

(20) years and has had

several prior non-traffic, but alcohol-related encounters with
Yazzie—i.e. public intoxication, disorderly conduct, etc.
R058 at pp. 6, 8, 15.

Although none of Halliday's prior

encounters with Yazzie were traffic

related, as typical

procedure Halliday requested identification from Yazzie during
more than ten (10) of these prior encounters.

Id.

at pp. 7

and 16. Halliday himself, however, does not recall if he has
ever specifically

requested a driver's license from Yazzie.

Id.

Halliday claims Yazzie never produced a

at p. 17.

4

driver's license as identification during these encounters,
Id.

even though he did have one.

At the time of the incident at issue herein, Halliday had
not had any type of encounter with Yazzie for more than one
year and had never had a traffic incident involving Yazzie.
R058 at pp. 15, 16.

Halliday himself stated that he had no

reason to believe that Yazzie had not obtained a driver's
license since he had last seen him, and that he was not aware
of any reason that would preclude Yazzie from doing so.

Id.

at p. 18.
The incident at issue in this appeal occurred on October
15, 2003, when Halliday observed Yazzie driving a vehicle.
Halliday followed Yazzie for four (4) blocks before pulling
him over and did not observe any traffic violations. R058 at
p. 8. Because Halliday had never conducted an official inquiry
into the matter, he mistakenly believed that Yazzie had never
obtained a Utah driver's license (a) because Yazzie had never
produced one during the prior non-traffic related encounters
and (b) because he had never seen Yazzie driving.

Id.

at pp.

13, 15. Halliday stated that, upon seeing Yazzie driving, he
would have "bet anything [Yazzie] had no license" and "would
have gave odds."

Id.

at p. 7.

5

Halliday also indicated that

he "would have given odds on the fact that

[Yazzie] was

drinkin'"

although

Yazzie

any

violations

observed

by

did

not

Halliday

and

commit
there

indications that Yazzie had been drinking.

were
Id.

traffic
no

other

at pp. 8, 9.

Upon observing Yazzie driving a vehicle, Halliday did not
attempt to contact dispatch to affirm or dispel his mistaken
belief because, in these circumstances where he believed a
driver had no license, his standard practice was to stop a
person and check rather than call dispatch.
B.

Id.

at p. 13.

Facts Occurring After the Seizure.

During the incident at issue in this appeal, Halliday
decided

to

pull

Yazzie

over

after

following

Yazzie

for

approximately four (4) blocks, not because he had observed any
traffic violations, but because he believed Yazzie was driving
without a license. R058 at pp. 8, 12, 13.

When Halliday

approached Yazzie and requested his driver's license, Yazzie
produced an Arizona driver's license, which turned out to be
valid when checked through dispatch.
at p. 7.

Id.

at pp. 8, 19/ R057

Halliday was aware that Arizona was an interstate

6

driving compact state1, but he did not let Yazzie go after
confirming the validity of the Arizona license.

Id.

at p. 19.

Halliday believed Yazzie was a resident of White Mesa2,
because he had been to Yazzie's house, Yazzie had given that
as

his address

in

investigations,

and Yazzie

had never

indicated to Halliday that he lived in another state. R058 at
pp. 10, 11, 12. Halliday, however, did not inquire as to why
Yazzie had an Arizona license, even though he was aware that
some Native Americans live on both sides of the state line.
Id.

at p. 11, 20.
Halliday testified that he did not inquire as to why

Yazzie
alcohol

had an Arizona
on Yazzie

license

because

and was more

possible impairment.

Id.

Halliday

concerned

at pp. 8, 20.

with

detected
Yazzie's

Upon detecting

alcohol, Halliday called Officer Mike Bradford ("Bradford") to
assist. R057 at p. 6.

On his way to assist and without any

direction from Halliday, Bradford called dispatch again and

1

The Drivers' License Compact (the "Compact") is
codified under UTAH CODE ANN. §53-3-604. Pursuant to Title
28, Chapter 6, Article 3 of the Arizona Revised Statutes,
Arizona adopted the Compact, specifically codified at §281852.
2

White Mesa is located in the four corners area
within the boundaries of Utah.
7

had them check Yazzie for a driver's license in Utah and the
four corner states.

Id.

at pp. 6-7, 9-10.

Dispatch informed

the officers that Yazzie had a suspended license in Utah.

Id.

at p. 8; R058 at p. 8.
Although as he approached he did not smell alcohol on
Yazzie, on direction from Halliday, Bradford performed field
sobriety tests on Yazzie and Yazzie did not pass them. R058 at
p. 8; R057 at p. 7.

Bradford then performed a breathalyzer

and the result was .222. R058 at p. 8.

After the incident,

upon pulling Yazzie's criminal history, it was determined that
his license was suspended for two (2) prior DUIs3 of which
Halliday was unaware at the time of the incident.
15.

Id.

at p.

Yazzie was charged with Driving Under the Influence of

Alcohol with priors, a Third Degree Felony; No Insurance on
Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Driving on Suspended
or Revoked Operator's License, a Class C Misdemeanor. R001R003.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution both

3

The Information
lists the dates for the priors as
September 5, 1995, and July 3, 2001 (R0001).
8

guarantee the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." "An unreasonable traffic stop is an
unconstitutional seizure.'' State v. Bisseqger, 2003 UT App
256, 76 P.3d 178; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1 28, 63 P.3d
650.

A stop is constitutionally justified if the officer has

reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant has been,
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. See, UTAH
CODE ANN.

1994).

§ 77-7-15; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah

This Court determines whether sufficient specific and

articulable facts exist to establish reasonable suspicion by
examining the totality of the facts and circumstances of the
case.

State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1159

(Utah

App.

1997)(citations omitted).
The totality of the circumstances in this matter do not
establish reasonable suspicion.

Halliday relied solely upon

Yazzie's prior non-traffic related encounters to mistakenly
assume that Yazzie had never obtained a Utah driver's license.
Halliday

observed

no

other

traffic

violations

prior

to

stopping Yazzie. The trial court then erroneously relied upon
the after-acquired
driver's

license

knowledge
as

regarding

support
9

for

Yazzie's

Halliday's

suspended

''reasonable

suspicion'' prior to the stop.

The circumstances in this

matter do not support a reasonable suspicion for Halliday to
have stopped Yazzie.

The trial court's denial of the Motion

should be reversed and the Judgment overturned in favor of
protecting Yazzie's Fourth Amendment right "to be secure ...
against unreasonable ... seizures."
ARGUMENT
HALLIDAY'S SUSPICION
WAS NOT REASONABLE
A.

The Fourth Amendment and Reasonable Suspicion.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution both
guarantee the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
"stopping

an

automobile

and

detaining

its

occupants

constitute[s] a seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and
the resulting detention quite brief.,f Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court in recent years have
both previously held that *[a]n unreasonable traffic stop is
10

an unconstitutional seizure." State v. Bisseaaer, 2003 UT App
256, 76 P.3d 178; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1 28, 63 P.3d
650,
The long-standing authority by which it is determined
whether a traffic stop is reasonable was conceived by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (U.S.Ohio 1968).

In Terry,

the U.S. Supreme Court held as follows:
In justifying particular intrusion, police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusionsfacts must be judged against objective standard of
whether facts available to officer at moment of
seizure or search would warrant man of reasonable
caution in belief that action taken was appropriate.
392 U.S. at 21; 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

The U.S. Supreme Court

noted that "[t]his demand for specificity in the information
upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching
of

[its] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."

(citations omitted) .

Id.

at fn. 18

The U.S. Supreme Court went on to

explain as follows:
The
scheme
of
the
Fourth Amendment
becomes
meaningful only when it is assured that at some
point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached,
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in
light of the particular circumstances.
11

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

"And in making that

assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against
[the] objective standard..." as set forth in Terry.

Id.;

U.S. at 21-22; 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (citations omitted).

The U.S.

392

Supreme Court explained further that "[a]nything less would
invite

intrusions

upon

constitutionally

guaranteed

rights

based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches,
a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction."
Id.;

392 U.S. at 22; 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (citations omitted).
To

determine

constitutionally
adopted

a

dual

whether

a

reasonable,
inquiry

the

from

search

or

Utah

Supreme

Terry:

(1)

seizure

is

Court

has

Was

the

police

officer's action justified at its inception? and (2) Was the
resulting

detention

reasonably

related

in

scope

to

the

circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place?
citing

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994)
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20; 88 S.Ct. at 1879.

Appellant

challenges only the constitutionality of the initial stop on
appeal in the instant matter so an analysis of the
portion of the dual inquiry is unnecessary.
Tetmver, 947 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah

12

See,

App. 1997).

second

State v.

A stop is constitutionally justified if the officer has
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant has been,
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. See, UTAH
CODE ANN.

1994).

§ 77-7-15; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah
Therefore, the issue herein is whether, based on the

facts of the case, Halliday's initial stop of Yazzie was
supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.

This Court

determines whether sufficient specific and articulable facts
exist to establish

reasonable

suspicion by

examining

the

totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. State v.
Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah

App. 1997), citing

v- Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing

State
Terry,

392 U.S. at 21; 88 S.Ct. at 1880; U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
7-8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); accord

S_£ate

v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1994)).
B.

The Facts and Circumstances of the Case.

Halliday has known Yazzie through law enforcement for
more than twenty (20) years and has had several prior nontraffic, but

alcohol-related

encounters

with

Yazzie—i.e.

public intoxication, disorderly conduct, etc. (R058 at pp. 6,
8, 15).

Although none of Halliday's prior encounters with

Yazzie were traffic related, as typical procedure Halliday

13

requested identification from Yazzie during more than ten (10)
of these prior encounters.

Id.

at pp. 7 and 16.

himself, however, does not recall if he has ever
requested a driver's license from Yazzie.

Id.

Halliday
specifically
at p. 17.

Halliday claims Yazzie never produced a driver's license as
identification during these encounters, even though he did
have one.

Id.

At the time of the incident at issue herein, Halliday had
not had any type of encounter with Yazzie for more than one
year and had never been involved with a traffic incident
pertaining to Yazzie (R058 at pp. 15, 16). Halliday himself
stated that he had no reason to believe that Yazzie had not
obtained a driver's license since he had last seen him, and
that he was not aware of any reason that would preclude Yazzie
from doing so.

Id.

at p. 18.

On October 15, 2003, Halliday observed Yazzie driving a
vehicle. Because Halliday had never conducted an official
inquiry into the matter, he mistakenly believed that Yazzie
had never obtained a Utah driver's license.

Specifically,

Halliday's misguided assumption was based on the fact that (a)
Yazzie had never produced a Utah driver's license during the
prior non-traffic related encounters and

14

(b) Halliday had

never seen Yazzie driving

(R058 at pp. 13, 15) .

Halliday

stated that, upon seeing Yazzie driving, he would have "bet
anything [Yazzie] had no license" and "would have gave odds."
Id.

at p. 7.
Upon observing Yazzie driving a vehicle, Halliday did not

attempt to contact dispatch to affirm or dispel his mistaken
belief.

In these circumstances where he believed a driver had

no license, his standard practice was to stop a person and
check rather than call dispatch.
C.

Id.

at p. 13.

The Facts Do Not Support the Finding That Yazzie Had
Not Had a License for a Long Time.

Based upon the facts articulated above, the trial court
found that Halliday had a reasonable suspicion requisite to
stop Yazzie (R058 at pp. 29) . The findings of the trial court
in this matter

were

only

articulated

orally

and

are

follows:
THE COURT: Okay.
Well, the reason why I wished the officer had
checked, ah, or watched, until he committed a
traffic violation, as he probably would have, is
that, ah, I'm gonna deny the motion to suppress.
But I think it could be appealed, and I'd just as
soon not have this added to my roster of reversals,
Court of Appeals. Because I think there's an issue
here. It's not a no-brainer. It could have been
one, and it isn't.
Ah, the reason that I think that it was
reasonable for the officer to stop is that it was
such a long time that the defendant had never had a
15

as

license. I think it's reasonable to — to believe
he still doesn't have one, and he's driving now.
But there's a fairly strong argument the other
way.
You know, maybe he decided to go get a
license, before he started drivin'. And in fact, he
did. In this case it turned out he did. He got it
from the wrong agency. It didn't do him any good.
It was both wrong, because he wasn't a resident of
Arizona, and because his license was — an even if
it was a valid Arizona license, it was useless in
Utah, because his privilege to drive in Utah was
suspended. But he had — he had apparently decided
he wanted to try to get a license.
But I think it was reasonable for the officer to
suspect that he did not have a license, that he was
driving based on that long history and the frequent
contact.
This is an unusual case. I wouldn't ordinarily
permit an officer to stop someone just because once
before, somebody didn't have a license. But because
of the number of times and the extended period of
time, I think it was reasonable for just him just to
assume that yeah, he still didn't have a license.
So I'm denying the motion to suppress.
Id.

at pp. 28-29.
The trial court found that it was reasonable for Halliday

to stop Yazzie because "...it was such a long time that the
defendant had never had a license." (R058 at p. 28).

This

finding is simply not supported by the testimony offered by
Halliday4.
mistaken

As

testimony

reveals, Halliday was under

the

assumption when he pulled Yazzie over that Yazzie had

4

Halliday was the only witness on either side to
provide testimony at the hearing on the Motion (R058 at p.
16

never

obtained

a

license5.

Bradford

and

Halliday

both

testified at the preliminary hearing and the hearing on the
Motion, respectively, that dispatch informed them that Yazzie
had obtained a Utah license (R057 at p. 8; R058 at p. 8) . The
State never offered any evidence as to when Yazzie obtained a
Utah license, and Halliday was personally unaware of any of
Yazzie's history regarding possible traffic violations (R058
at p. 14)•
This finding is erroneously based on Halliday's mistaken
assumption that Yazzie never had a license.

Halliday had no

personal knowledge of such information and testified that he
discovered later that he was incorrect in his assumption. The
trial court erred in relying upon this misinformation, and
erroneously

concluded

that

Halliday

had

the

reasonable

suspicion requisite to a constitutional stop.
D.

The Facts Do Not Support a Reasonable Articulable
Suspicion.

There is "no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against
the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." State v.

5

Halliday did not believe that Yazzie had a suspended
or revoked license when he pulled him over. Halliday simply
believed that Yazzie had never obtained a Utah license (R058
at p. 13).
17

Lopez,

873 P.2d

1127, 1133

original) {quoting

(Utah 1994)

(alterations in

Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct.

1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1734, 18 L.Ed.2d 930
(1967)); see also

2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §

5.1(h), at 435-36 (1987). In other words, "the permissibility
of

a particular

law

enforcement

practice

is

judged

by

balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests." State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah,1995)

citing

Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59
L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
(1) An Individual of Reasonable Caution Would
Believe the Actions Taken Bv Hallidav Were
Inappropriate.
Facts surrounding a seizure "...must be judged against
objective standard of whether facts available to officer at
moment of seizure or search would warrant man of reasonable
caution in belief that action taken was appropriate." Terry,
392 U.S. at 21; 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

" [KJnowledge of a person's

prior criminal involvement ... is alone insufficient to give
rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion." United States v.
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The 10th Circuit

Sandoval. 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir.1994).
Court of Appeals explained as follows:

If the law were otherwise, any person with any sort
of criminal record—or even worse, a person with
arrests but no convictions—could be subjected to a
Terry-type investigation stop by a law enforcement
officer at any time without the need for any other
justification at all. Any such rule would clearly
run counter to the requirement of a reasonable
suspicion, and of the need that such stops be
justified in light of a balancing of the competing
interests at stake....
Sandoval. 29 F.3d at 543.

To allow Halliday's stop of Yazzie

to be considered constitutional would run contrary to the
requirement of a reasonable suspicion.
Halliday

knew

Yazzie

through

non-traffic

encounters.

Halliday had asked Yazzie for

during

encounters, but not

these

license.

Since

license, Halliday

Yazzie
at

did

not

some point

identification

specifically
produce

a driver's

a Utah

incorrectly

related

driver's

assumed

that

Yazzie had never obtained one, even though Yazzie had never
indicated as such and had actually obtained one.
More

than

a

year

passed

in

which

Halliday

encounter Yazzie or ask for his identification.

did

not

Then on

October 15, 2003, Halliday observed Yazzie driving, at which
point Halliday mistakenly believed his unchecked and outdated

19

assumption to be true to the extent that he did not even radio
dispatch to affirm or dispel his assumption before pulling
Yazzie over.
To

allow

these

facts

to

articulate

the

requisite

reasonable suspicion would run contrary to reasonableness
itself. For instance, an individual who provides an alternate
form of identification to police would be assumed to not have
a driver's license and, even a year after the encounter, could
be pulled over on suspicion of driving without a license.
Another example would be an individual who is cited for
driving without a license is pulled over even more than a year
later based solely on the assumption that they must not have
obtained a license during that year.

Neither of these

circumstances are "reasonable" and are obviously intrusive of
the individual's Fourth Amendment rights, as is the instant
case.
Hence

the

determination

reasoning

that

prior

behind
criminal

the

10th

involvement

Circuit's
alone

is

insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion. Sandoval

at 542.

Halliday

based his suspicion

on his prior

involvement

with Yazzie and the fact that Yazzie never provided him with
a Utah driver's license as identification.

Just because he

never provided Halliday with one did not automatically mean he

20

did not have one, and surely did not rise to justify pulling
Yazzie over if he ever saw him driving a vehicle.
intruded

upon Yazzie's

constitutionally

Halliday

guaranteed

rights

based on nothing more substantial than an inarticulate hunch.
See,

Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; 88 S.Ct. at 1880

(citations

omitted).
(2) The
Suspended
Utah
License
is Evidence
Discovered After the Stop and Cannot Be
Considered in a Reasonable Suspicion Analysis.
Reasonable suspicion determinations turn on the facts
known to the officer at

the

fn. 6 (emphasis added).
cannot be considered.

time

of

the

stop.

Lopez at 1138,

Evidence discovered after the stop
Id.;

see,

State v. Baird, 7 63 P.2d

1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988) . In Lopez, this Court stated that
"if the trial court finds no traffic violation, then the stop
is

not

justified

unconstitutional."

at

its

inception

and

is

therefore

Lopez at 1139.

Prior to the stop, Halliday believed Yazzie did not have
a Utah driver's license.

Not until after a thorough check

with dispatch was it determined that Yazzie's driver's license
in Utah was suspended.

The fact that Yazzie's license was

suspended in Utah was evidence discovered after

the stop and

cannot be considered in the analysis of whether Halliday had
a reasonable suspicion.

Lopez at 1138.
21

However, the trial court did erroneously consider the
suspension of Yazzie's Utah driver's license in determining
whether Halliday had a reasonable suspicion to stop Yazzie.
The trial court stated in its findings that Yazzie had
attempted to get a license, but "...even if it was a valid
Arizona license, it was useless in Utah, because his privilege
to drive

in Utah was

suspended."

(R058 at pp. 28-29).

Halliday did not have this information available to him to
form the requisite reasonable suspicion.
Driving without a Utah license was the alleged violation
in support of Halliday's reasonable suspicion to pull Yazzie
over.

However, the State did not charge Yazzie with this

violation, hence the trial court did not have the opportunity
to address it.

Since Yazzie was not charged with this

violation, there were no means of finding that he committed
it. Thus, the stop was not justified at its inception and the
seizure was unconstitutional.

Lopez at 1139.

(3) Reliance Upon Mistaken Information Does Not
Support a Reasonable Suspicion.
In State v. Lopez, Officer Hamner testified that while he
was working as an undercover narcotics officer, Lopez was
TT

pointed out" to him as Jose Cruz, a known drug dealer.

P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994).
showed no driver's license.

873

A computer check on Jose Cruz
Id.
22

Officer Hamner pulled Lopez

over based on the erroneous information that he was Jose Cruz
driving without a license.

Id.

at 1131.

Lopez had never

represented himself to Officer Hamner as being named or going
by the name of Jose Cruz.

Id.

The Supreme Court of Utah

determined that it was reasonable to assume from these facts
that "...the trial court found no reasonable suspicion to stop
Lopez for driving without a license."
Similarly

here,

Halliday

Id.

relied

upon

erroneous

information pertaining to Yazzie to effectuate the stop at
issue. Halliday pulled Yazzie over on the mistaken assumption
that he had never obtained a Utah driver's license.

It was

later found that Yazzie had obtained a Utah driver's license.
Halliday did not

testify that Yazzie ever indicated that he

did not have a Utah driver's license, only that he didn't
produce one in non-traffic encounters.

It is reasonable for

this Court to assume from these facts that Halliday relied
upon an erroneous assumption and, accordingly, there was no
reasonable suspicion for Halliday to pull Yazzie over in his
vehicle.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE,
respectfully

based

upon

the

foregoing,

Appellant

requests that this Court reverse the trial

court's Judgment and order such other relief as it deems
necessary.
DATED this 9th day of September, 2004.

William L. Schultz
Counsel for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of September, 2004,
I mailed, first class postage prepaid, true and correct copies
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to:
J. Frederick Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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Addendum ~A~
Judgment and Order of
Commitment to Utah State
Prison,
dated March 30, 2004
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF COMMITMENT TO
UTAH STATE PRISON

vs.
CLIFTON YAZZIE
DOB: 01/29/1961,

Case No. 0317-98
Case Judge: Lyle R. Anderson

Defendant.

MARCH 29, 2004
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON
Plaintiff Attorney: Craig C. Halls
Defendant Attorney: William L. Schultz
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing judgment in this case, and the
defendant being present in Court and represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore
entered a plea of guilty to the offenses of:
COUNT 1: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, a Third
Degree Felony; COUNT 2: NO INSURANCE ON MOTOR VEHICLE, a Class B Misdemeanor;
and COUNT 3: DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED OPERATOR'S LICENSE, a
Class C Misdemeanor; and no legal reason having been shown why judgment of this Court
should not be pronounced, it is the judgment and sentence of this court as follows, to wit: that the
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defendant, CLIFTON YAZZIB, be imprisoned in the UTAII STATB PRISON for a term not *>
exceed RVE (5) YEARS on Count 1, SIX (6) MONTHS on Count 2 and NINETY (90) DAYS
on Count 3, to be served concurrently.
Defendant is also ordered to pay $250restitutionto San Joan County for the Public
Defender's Fund.
Defendant JS hereby remanded iv the custody of tfce San Juan County Sheriff or other
proper officer to be transported to tfie Utah State Prison.
DATED this 3$U

4** of March, 2004.

Sistrict Court Judge
sr-r^
Craig C. Hall*
San Juan County Attorney
fn'KK r r m r ATK O F tvTATTiw?
I HEREBY CERTIFY Hurt on the i f i l _ day of March. 2004,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a
true and corwet copy of the fbregning JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT to
William L. Sehiliz. Attorney for defendant, PO Box 937, Moab, UT 84532; Adult Probation
Department &tU6S South Highway 191 #3, Moab, UT 84532; and to the Department of
Corrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 8402O.
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defendant, CLIFTON YAZZIE, be imprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON for a term not to
exceed FIVE (5) YEARS on Count 1, SDC (6) MONTHS on Count 2 and NINETY (90) DAYS
on Count 3, to be served concurrently.
Defendant is also ordered to pay $250 restitution to San Juan County for the Public
Defender's Fund.
Defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the San Juan County Sheriff or other
proper officer to be transported to the Utah State Prison.
DATED this
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day of March, 2004.

Lyle R. Anderson
District Court Judge

Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
day of March, 2004,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT to
William L. Schultz, Attorney for defendant, PO Box 937, Moab, UT 84532; Adult Probation
Department at 1165 South Highway 191 #3, Moab, UT 84532; and to the Department of
Corrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020.
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entered » plea of guilty to the offenses of:
COUNT 1: DRIVING UNDER THE INFIXIFNCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, a Third
Degree Felony; COUNT 2: NO INSURANCE ON MOTOR VEHICLE, a Class B Misdemeanor,
and COUNT 3: DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED OPERATOR'S LICENSE, a
Class C Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having been shown why judgment of this Court
shoiiM not be pronounced, it is the judgment and sentence of this court asfollows,to wit: that the
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defendant, CLIFTON YAZZIE, be imprisoned in the UTAII STATE PRISON for a term not *>
exceed HVE (5) YEARS on Cotmt 1, SIX (6) MONTHS on Count 2 and MNJBTY (90) DAYS
on Count 3, to be served concurrently.
Defendant is also ordered to pay $250 restitution to San Juan County for the Public
Dcfcudcr'sFund.
Defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the Saa Juan County Sheriff or other
proper officer to be transported to the Utah State Prison.
DATED this y/jU

day of Match. 2004.

J^n^Afiaerson
^District
wstrict Court Judge
Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
QSKXIFICATE OF MAILING

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of March, 2004,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT to
William L. Schnltz, Attorney for defendant, PO Box 937, Moab, UT 84532; Adult Probation
Departmentat 1165 South Highway 191 #3, Moab,UT 84532; and to the Department of
Corrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020.
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